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Abstract 
This study focuses on the networks of board members of Moroccan religious organisations in 
Amsterdam, and their ability to contribute to the (political) participation of the members or 
visitors of the organisations. Networks and their interlocks are of great relevance for society 
as they can contribute to the development of (political) participation of citizens. Dense 
networks generate political trust (Berger, 2012, p. 71). The density of the horizontal networks 
is crucial: the denser the network of associations of a particular ethnic group, the more 
political trust they will have and the more they will participate politically’ (Fennema & Tillie, 
2001, p. 33). 
Moroccan Muslims in Amsterdam are less organised than other Muslim groups (Slootman & 
Tillie, 2006, p. 53). Despite the fragmentation in the Moroccan Muslim community, there are 
organisations that serve the members of this community: mosques, social/cultural 
organisations and so-called umbrella organisations. This study investigates the inter-
connectivity between 135 board members of the Moroccan 18 mosques, four social/cultural 
organisations in Amsterdam and six umbrella organisations.  
In the database, which formed the starting point of the analysis, a selection could be made to 
explore what persons have multiple board memberships, i.e. in different boards, the so-called 
double-functions. This is the case for only seven persons, not the most well-known persons in 
the arena according to the information collected from the internet. In the absence of relevant, 
visible interlocks, the conclusion is that the board members of mosques, social/cultural 
organisations and umbrella organisations do not play a significant role in the participation and 
integration process of the visitors of their mosques.  
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1 Introduction 
Do the networks of (members of) Moroccan mosque organisations contribute to the political 
participation of its members? Networks and the relevance of networking have received more 
attention in the past decades, not the least since the upcoming of social media. Being linked to 
many others seems to provide a certain status different from being a loner, and can include 
incentives such as (important) information that one would have missed without the 
membership of one or more groups.  
Particular groups may look like a tight community, while in practice the opposite is true 
(Warner & Wenner, 2006, pp. 458, 462). In the aftermath of 9/11, the Muslims were called 
upon, supposedly as one group. This was also the case in the Netherlands after the killing of 
Theo van Gogh in 2004. Particularly after this event and nearby, the distinction between 
Muslims and non-Muslims has been put on edge (Boender, 2007, p. 54). Newspaper De 
Volkskrant published an article ‘Attack to Democracy’ in which it stated that Muslims must 
accept that in a democracy also religion is not without criticism2. NRC paper reported the lack 
of leadership and intelligentsia within the Muslim community3. Furthermore, the perception 
that the integration of (all) Moroccan migrants has failed, based on the number of Moroccan 
migrants with a criminal record, and the fact that the majority still maintains ties with the 
home country Morocco and has the Moroccan identity for life (Bouras, 2013, p. 1221), is an 
example of the way Moroccan migrants are seen as one group.  
However, strong fragmentation of the Muslim community blocked the way for those who 
aimed to reach all Muslims, especially on sensitive topics (Sunier, 2014, p. 11). In 2004, 
because of the fragmentation, the Minister of Justice Verdonk acknowledged the Contact 
organ Muslims and Government (CMO4) as the official and only spokesperson for Muslims in 
the Netherlands5. Soon after this installation, the Minister decided to install a second 
organisation: the Contact Group Islam (CGI). This double installation indicates the scattered 
network of Muslims, which consists not only of various Islam streams but of a diversity in 
organisations within these streams: the Muslim community in Amsterdam (the city that is 
central in this study) only consists of over 100 mosques, and their followers originate from 
                                                 
2 http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/aanslag-op-de-democratie~a712930/ 
3 http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2002/01/02/imams-moeten-naar-cursus-inburgering-7571361  
4 In Dutch: Contactorgaan Moslim en Overheid 
5 Source: http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/verdonk-erkent-cmo-als-gesprekspartner~a703719/; 
http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2004/02/05/eis-verdonk-moslimraad-onverdeeld-7672650 
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Mediterranean/North-African countries, the Middle-East, Asia, Surinam and others. They do 
not speak the same language and differ in religious notions and cultural background.  
Next to the communicational aspect of having one point of contact, the efforts of the Minister 
may have led to increased interconnectivity of the Muslim community in the Netherlands. The 
effects of such interconnectivity for society not should be underrated. Networks and their 
interlocks are at least potentially of great relevance for society as they may contribute to the 
development of (political) participation of citizens. Dense networks likely generate political 
trust (Berger, 2012, p. 71). The density of the horizontal networks is crucial in this respect: 
‘the denser the network of associations of a particular ethnic group, the more political trust 
they will have and the more they will participate politically’ (Fennema & Tillie, 2001, p. 33). 
In the absence of networks people tend to act only in their own interest and do not invest in 
participation in their (local) community (Berger et al, 2001, pp. 19-21). In migrant 
communities, especially within cities, (in)formal leaders of civic organisations play an 
important role in connecting actors from various backgrounds. They are able to break down 
barriers, extend beyond boundaries and understand when to intervene in such a way that the 
interests of all actors within the domain are taken into account (van den Brink et al, 2012, pp. 
92-94, 99-100, 106).  
The local government has a substantial interest in strong connections with the boards of 
organisations within their community (Maussen, 2007, p. 31). If board members only operate 
in the organisation they administer and do not participate in the wider (local) political or civil 
community, it is unlikely that they contribute to the participation process of their followers. 
On the other hand, if they are part of a dense network with ties at the political level and play a 
role in the community at large, and stimulate visitors and members of the mosque community 
to look beyond the boundaries of that single organisation. Interlocking directorates within the 
ethnic community can also play an important role to develop alliances and to bridge gaps 
between citizens with various cultural/ethnical backgrounds (Fennema, 2004, p. 433).  
Focusing on the Muslim organisations in Amsterdam, Moroccan Muslims are less organised 
than other Muslim groups (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p. 53). Compared to other migrants with 
a Muslim background, Moroccan migrants in Amsterdam have the lowest trust in the Dutch 
community and their level of participation in the local community is lowest. (Slootman & 
Tillie, 2006, p. 60). Nevertheless and despite the fragmentation in the Moroccan Muslim 
community, there are many organisations that aim to serve the members of this community by 
organising events and activities where Moroccan migrants meet, learn the Dutch language and 
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culture, and worship. From the 1970s mosques in many cases became the centre of networks 
of migrant organisations (Maussen, 2007, p. 12) by facilitating their activities under the roof 
of the mosque. The perception of outsiders regarding mosque organisations is two-fold. One 
can see the mosque as a meeting place where there is ample opportunity to learn to participate 
(Maussen, 2007, p. 12) or the mosque is seen as a breeding place for radical Islam ideas, led 
by spiritual leaders or imams’ coming from an Islamic country where Islamic law rules 
(Douwes, 2009, p. 93). In the first case, it is assumed that the board of a mosque has sufficient 
social capital to contribute to the participation of its members and visitors. When board 
members participate in social networks they can serve as role model for their adherents, and 
function as linking pin towards other organisations and networks (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 
713).  
The board members of mosque organisations have decision powers regarding policy issues 
and the activities that are developed and carried out within the mosque organisation. But do 
board members play a role in the social and political participation of their members? This is 
the central question of this study. To answer this, insight in the organisational structure of the 
mosque organisations and possible umbrella organisations is necessary to understand the 
position and the scope of board members. As the double-functions or interlocks of board 
members are an important indicator to ascertain the contribution to participation (Fennema & 
Tillie, 1999, p. 713), the presence or absence of the interlocks are relevant for this study.  
To investigate whether board member of mosque organisations play a role in the social and 
political participation of their members, the following sub-questions will have to be answered:  
 What is the organisational structure of the Moroccan Muslim community in Amsterdam?  
 What are the interlocks of board members of Moroccan mosque organisations in 
Amsterdam? 
 Is the network of the board members potentially effective to enable these members to 
contribute to the (political) participation and integration of their visitors/mosque 
members? 
In order to get insight in the networks of board members of Moroccan mosque organisations, 
network analysis is a method that can reveal answers to these questions since such analysis is 
about the interdependence flow of influence of individuals, groups, and institutions. The 
structure of a network may provide insights in social and political behaviour. Also, it can 
show how close persons in the network are and their dependency of each other’s connections 
(Ward, Stovel, & Sacks, 2011, p. 256): it may be that particular persons do not have a dense 
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network but that their network includes a big linker, i.e. a person with multiple connections on 
a high level.  
1.1 Objective 
In previous studies6 on the networks of (Moroccan) Muslims in the Netherlands, the 
connections between their organisations or members and other civil society and political 
organisations already have been investigated (Alink et al, 1998; Fennema and Tillie, 1999; 
Pennix and Schrover, 2001; van Heelsum, 2001, 2005; Maliepaard and Gijsberts, 2012). 
Most of these studies focused on the connections of Muslim organisations with non-Muslim 
organisations, such as political parties, religious organisations and communal institutions. 
Fennema argues that it is not specifically the connections with non-Muslims that contribute to 
the integration and participation of Muslim migrants (Fennema, 2004, p. 433). Another study, 
carried out by Van Heelsum the relationship between political participation of three 
immigrant groups and their civic community was investigated, with a focus of the immigrant 
groups in the four largest cities in the Netherlands. The outcome is that the Moroccan 
community in Amsterdam is most isolated compared to the community of migrants from 
Turkey and Suriname (van Heelsum, 2005, p. 24). Van Heelsum concluded that this outcome 
did not differ from earlier research by Fennema and Tillie (1999) who focused on the density 
of connections in Amsterdam. The study of Alink and associates (1998) was based on the 
input of Moroccan organisations, which included also sports and leisure organisations. 
Until now, particular research on interconnectivity and on the extent in which this actually 
contributes to participation has not been carried out solely within the religious Moroccan 
Muslim community in Amsterdam.  
The aim of this study is to learn whether board members of Moroccan religious organisations 
can play a role in the participation process of their mosque members/visitors. The findings 
may give insight in the network of the board members, and the interdependence between the 
Moroccan mosque organisations in Amsterdam.  
1.2 Scientific and societal relevance 
This study will generate knowledge about the interconnectivity and density of the network of 
board members of mosques. This knowledge may serve scholars on ethnical/religious 
organisations and their contribution to the development of participation of Muslim migrants.  
                                                 
6 Van Heelsum: Political Participation and Civic Community of Ethnic Minorities in Four Cities in the 
Netherlands 
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Through network analysis on board members of Moroccan mosques, the interconnectivity and 
the strength of ties between individuals and organisations in society and politics, becomes 
visible. This is relevant for civic or governmental organisations and individuals who play a 
role in the integration of Moroccan Muslim migrants in Amsterdam. Gaining insight in the 
organisational structure of the Moroccan Muslim community can also serve policies regarding 
integration and (political) participation initiatives and contributes to the civil community (van 
den Brink et al, 2012, pp. 92-94). Vital communities cannot exist without active participation. 
If the particular individuals – in this case board members of mosque organisations – operate 
as loners in an isolated position or act as linkers in a strong network with relevant 
stakeholders, policy regarding joint actions in the field of integration and participation 
initiatives can be developed that optimally serves these actions. With modern technologies 
and the increasing availability of data through the internet, also on a topic level, network 
analysis can be performed to generate such knowledge and insights (Ward et al, 2011, p. 247). 
1.3 Method 
This study is based on desk research, with the internet as the main source of information. First 
of all, umbrella organisations of Moroccan Muslim associations and foundations are 
identified. Then, Moroccan mosque and social/cultural organisations are identified and 
included in a database, to which the relevant umbrella organisations are added. The database 
includes information on name, type of organisation (mosque, umbrella, social/cultural), 
address, and type of registration in the Trade Register.  
For each organisation in the database the board members are identified and registered, with 
the following variables: name, mosque organisation, position in the mosque, age, place and 
country of birth, and gender. With this data, the first analysis regarding interlocks, i.e. persons 
who have positions in two or more boards of different organisations, has been carried out. In 
order to investigate whether there are more interlocks, that cannot be retrieved solely from the 
data of the Trade Register, complementary data has been collected via an internet search: 
other (professional) position(s), nationality, number of hits on the worldwide web, (number 
of) memberships of other organisations, membership or connection with (local) political 
parties/organisations, particular data that can be directly linked with the person, performances 
in media in relation to board membership, social, cultural actions or activities, and to 
profession. These data formed the input for a second analysis which was undertaken to rule 
out that there would be more interlocks analysis that were not identified with the data from 
the Trade registry. For the analysis the network analysis tool Lynks was employed. This tool 
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enables to build graphic overviews of the board membership(s) and the possible interlocks 
with other organisations7. 
 
                                                 
7 The in-browser tool is developed by the Centre of Innovation of Leiden University/Campus The Hague in 
2014, in co-creation with Eelke Heemskerk. The following link shows the animated network: 
https://lynksoft.com/share?config=545  
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2 Theoretical framework 
The value of the networks of leaders in organisation is dependent on various factors. When 
including religious Moroccan organisations in civil society, the role of civil society in general 
and of religious/ethnic organisations in particular is important. Civil society is the 
representation of formal and informal organisations that contribute to the well-being of the 
citizens in a community. Civil society includes values that contribute to democracy, consists 
of horizontal networks and creates trust (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 706). Trust is one of the 
basic elements of social capital, which is considered to be the cement of civil society 
(Putnam, 1993, p. 188). In order to determine whether Moroccan religious organisations may 
contribute to the participation of its members, it is important to identify the conditions for this 
contribution. In this chapter, some key elements that contribute to participation are presented.  
2.1 The civil society 
This study focuses on the presence of interlocks between members of Moroccan religious 
boards in Amsterdam. In this study such organisations are considered to be part of the civil 
society of Amsterdam. Many of the Moroccan religious organisations8 even claim that they 
serve the community by facilitating Muslims to carry out their religious duties and provide a 
meeting place for people to learn from each other, to socialise, and to get tools that help them 
to integrate in the wider Amsterdam community (van Heelsum, 2001, p. 24).  
Why are civil society organisations important for democracy? Civil society is the 
representation of formal and informal organisations that contribute to the well-being of the 
citizens in a community. Neither the leader nor the law, but the sharing of opinions on a great 
number of topics is the starting point for the establishment of organisations within the society 
(de Tocqueville, 1840, p. 598). Neither state, family nor the market economy has control over 
the civil society: ‘it excludes those spheres where human relations are driven either by 
biological necessities (the family), by economic necessity (the market) or by force (state)’ 
(Fennema, 2004, p. 429).  
Civil organisations are a necessity in democratic states, at least according to Tocqueville. He 
claims that there are no other instruments than civil organisations to control the power of 
authorities or stop the abuses of the power of governments in democracies (de Tocqueville, 
                                                 
8 Examples of activities: http://moskeebadr.nl/index.php; http://blauwemoskee.nl/; http://www.al-
ihsane.nl/index.php/over-de-moskee/activiteiten; http://moskeealkabir.nl/activiteiten/; http://www.moskee-
sounnat.nl/  
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1840, p. 307). Tocqueville distinguishes three levels of organisation: informal meetings 
between people with the same interests; the appearance for small audiences; and the formation 
of an association that can be compared with a government, with the power to attack proposals 
and laws, and with election formats. Opposed to governments, associations do not have the 
right to make rules and laws, but they can influence the powers by attacking existing rules and 
proposing laws that are in the interest of the adherents of the associations (de Tocqueville, 
1840, p. 305). The citizens may perceive the influence of leaders of institutions on a local 
level stronger than of those acting on a national level as there are more appearances. As 
Tocqueville mentions: ‘The general interests of the country touch its inhabitants only from 
time to time’ (de Tocqueville, 1840, p. 583). Local institutions are supposed to have a closer 
relationship to the citizens, due to the absence of the geographical distance and resulting from 
the fact that the subjects they strike are closer to the perception of the citizens. (van den Brink 
et al, 2012, p. 107).  
In the development and maintenance of civil society, the process of connecting persons and 
organisations serves to bridge gaps between them and makes cooperation possible, even 
though their (cultural) background, interests and objectives may differ (van den Brink et al 
2012, pp. 99-100). However, the performance of the civil society depends on the political 
context and situation of a country. In countries with weak political institutions, citizens may 
perceive that their interests are not taken into account; they can be sensitive for civil society 
organisations that aim to undermine the legitimacy of the political institutions of those 
countries (Berman, 1997, pp. 569-570). This can be the same case for mosque organisations: 
there is a chance that in the absence of a strong board, undesirable or more specific radical 
influences receive space. (Roex et al, 2010, p. 32).  
Civil society organisations are measured by the degree of voluntariness and of autonomy 
(Fennema, 2004, p. 431). Putnam argues that religious organisations are not part of civil 
society as they are vertically organised and have a strong hierarchical structure: ‘the civic 
community is a secular community’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 210). Although this may be correct for 
some or even many religious organisations, there is no evidence that religious organisations 
by definition are more vertically organised than other organisations within civil society 
(Berman, 1997, p. 567). In this study the religious organisations are considered to be part of 
civil society, especially as the mosque organisations in Amsterdam do not only serve as 
religious institutes but also play a more general social, cultural role. Botterman and associates 
claim that religious participation contributes to the enrichment of social networks, i.e. 
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participation in other fields than the religious environment (Botterman et al, 2009, p. 9). This 
is consistent with the conclusions of Fennema and Tillie in their study about political 
participation and political trust: (learning to) participate in one organisation or network can 
generate positive effects regarding participation in other spheres (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 
723). The majority of the organisations that were established for or by (Muslim) migrants 
served to create and secure a collective identity (de Jong, 2007, p. 24). Multi-function 
mosques can serve as ‘safe haven’ and may gain the trust of their visitors and stimulate them 
to integrate and participate in the country of residence (Maussen, 2007, pp. 12-14). Fennema 
and Tillie argue that these organisations ‘do not necessarily have a negative impact on the 
functioning of local democracy’; furthermore, the absence of these ethnic organisations in 
civil society is perceived as negative. Also in non-democratic organisations people learn to 
participate. (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 723). They and many other scholars refer to Putnam’s 
research on the civic community in Italy (Putnam, 1993): the civil society with many 
horizontal links, opposed to those with a strong hierarchical structure, contributes to the 
involvement of its citizens.  
2.2 Social capital 
Social capital is produced through networks of relationships (La Hue & Huckfeldt, 1998, p. 
571). Social capital ‘[..] refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’ 
(Putnam, 1993, pp. 144, 167). Other virtues of social capital are solidarity, honesty and 
reliability. The value of each virtue of social capital is dependent on the size of the civil 
organisation and its objectives. In small groups, such as families, with a strong sense of 
solidarity amongst its members, trust may not go beyond the group. In large groups trust may 
not be as strong as in small groups, but when the group performs positive action with external 
effects that is beyond the borders of the group, trust can go beyond the group members 
(Fukuyama, 2001, pp. 13-14). The latter is relevant for the participation of the members of 
those groups. With social capital, objectives can be reached that would not be possible 
without collective action (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 723).  
The social capital of migrants’ networks such as mosque or other ethnic organisations, is an 
important indicator for the success of integration processes. This can also lead to participation 
by persons who have never been active in (civil) society at all (Martiniello, 2006, p. 6). Trust 
is an important factor, communicational skills which are not limited to knowing the language 
but also being able to participate in discussions an debates.  
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Trust can lead to active (political) participation. When trust is absent, it is not likely that 
people invest in participation in their community (Berger et al, 2001, pp. 19-21). An 
important incentive of participation in religious networks is that it lowers the threshold to 
contribute to civil society and charity work (Botterman et al, 2009, p. 9). Without political 
trust, the chance is that people will not participate in politics or that they turn to initiatives 
outside the political spectrum in order to accomplish their goals (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p. 
47). According to Fennema and Tillie, ‘low trust is probably more harmful to democratic 
institutions than low participation and the two concepts are most certainly related’ (Fennema 
& Tillie, 1999, p. 705). The absence of trust can very well be bridged by interlocking 
directorates. When a board member of a migrant organisation is also representative of a 
(political) non-ethnical organisation, this may generate the trust that is needed to diminish the 
ethnic boundaries (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 713).  
Civil society organisations are capable of creating social capital and of putting barriers in 
place to avoid situations that could break down the civil society values. For example, ethnic 
boundaries can be put in place to prevent migrants to build up social capital in the country of 
destination (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 713). This can disturb the integration of migrants, e.g. 
when they are excluded from building up social capital in the country of destination on the 
basis of their country of birth or nationality. Also, this may have a negative effect on the trust 
migrants are building up.  
In an organisation with a violent mission, the members can share virtues like the keeping of 
commitments and the compliance with duties that are part of the group arrangements 
(Fukuyama, 2001, p. 8). This social capital may not lead to actions that favours the whole 
country. In the case of low social capital, such as an absence of trust in ethnic organisations, 
the fear is that (young) people will turn to radical movements9. (More) social capital can 
prevent radicalisation (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p. 51).  
2.3 Participation 
Social capital encourages persons to take part in political activities (La Hue & Huckfeldt, 
1998, p. 579). Political participation is understood as the active dimension of citizenship. It 
refers to the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of the collective 
affairs of a given political community (Martiniello, 2006, p. 3). For political participation by 
migrants, the (political) integration in the country of destination is conditional. Political 
                                                 
9 According to Slootman & Tillie, radicalisation implies that there is a decrease of trust in society (Slootman and 
Tillie, 2006, p. 51) 
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integration according to Martiniello has four dimensions, the granting of rights; identification 
with the country of destination; the adoption of values and norms; and the political 
participation. The granting of rights is an indicator for the extent that migrants can integrate. 
The identification with the country of destination and the adoption of democratic norms and 
values are necessary conditions for political integration (Martiniello, 2006, p. 2).  
In studies on political participation, the examples of actions by citizens in this field is often 
mentioned as taking part in debates, being member of political parties, using the right to vote, 
(Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 709). Other actions that are part of the spectrum of political 
participation can be protest demonstrations, boycotts, hunger strikes and other unconventional 
activities. Also, membership of or involvement in trade unions or civil society organisations 
can be seen as political activity (Martiniello, 2006, pp. 4, 17). 
In their dimensions of active citizenship, Rusinoviec and associates define political 
participation by migrants as: using the voting right at local elections and being member of a 
political party. It could be concluded that political participation is always accompanied by 
concrete actions. Identification (with a political party) is not considered to be part of political 
participation (Rusinoviec et al, 2009, p. 15). However, identification with the ‘new’ country 
reinforces the political integration of migrants (Martiniello, 2006, p. 2). An aspect that 
contributes to participation is the degree of accessibility to the democratic system (Koopmans, 
2004, pp. 452-453). If the societal structure provides opportunities for participation, facilities 
to gain citizenship and nationality and voting rights for migrants, political participation by 
migrants will be stronger than in countries where migrants enjoy only rights that are directly 
linked with labour (Martiniello, 2006, p. 6). In the Netherlands, the degree of access to the 
democratic system and the granting of cultural group rights to migrants is high (Koopmans, 
2004, pp. 452-453). This gives migrants the opportunity to organise themselves, and to apply 
to organisations. In societies where there is a low degree of accessibility and rights granting, it 
is expected that migrants will be more politically oriented on their country of origin, which 
may have a negative effect on integration and participation (Koopmans, 2004, p. 457). 
Acknowledgement of migrant organisations by governmental institutions or other players in 
civil society can diminish distance. The more migrant organisations are recognised and called 
to account on their bridging role between their adherents and social society, the more they 
serve as binding agent in the adherents’ process towards participation. According to Penninx 
and Schrover, this conclusion is not based only on the practice of the past decades, but goes 
back to the past four centuries (Penninx & Schrover, 2001, p. 57). 
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Berger and associates distinguish three fields of participation: opportunities for individual 
citizens, for ethnical organisations and for umbrella organisations/advisory institutions 
(Berger et al, 2001, p. 42). Participation in one context can have a positive effect on 
participating elsewhere (Botterman et al, 2009, p. 9). Participation is seen as a self-reinforcing 
action: experience in participation, for example by being active in mosque context, has a 
positive effect on political participation of migrants (Hooghe, 1999, p. 503).  
Research on political participation of ethnical groups in the main cities in the Netherlands 
indicates that the more these groups call upon their members to invest in the joint objectives, 
the members will generate more trust in the own organisation and its fellow members. If 
organisations have strong ties, this trust will not only have its effect on the relationships 
between their members but also on the relationships with persons that are not part of the own 
organisation (Fennema and Tillie, 1999, p. 705; Heelsum, 2001, p. 5; Berger et al, 2001, p. 
20).  
Research on religious socialisation shows that for integration, it is not necessary to abandon 
the culture and religion of the country of origin: Maliepaard and associates parental influence 
on religious education is most dominant compared to the influence of school teachers or 
spiritual leaders in the mosque. Friends of the own ethnic group of youth play an important 
role as well. If they have an open mind for undesirable behaviour, this can influence Muslim 
youth. Youngsters who have been raised in a religious family and visited the mosque with 
their parents on a regular basis, show more religious participation and connection with the 
mosque at a later stage than others. This does not seem to lead to a rejection of the culture and 
religion of the country of origin, or disturb integration processes (Maliepaard et al, 2013, pp. 
4-5).  
In the 1990s, the efforts of the city of Amsterdam to support political participation of migrants 
were focused on the individual citizen. The so-called minority advisory boards that were 
established to serve integration and participation were supposed to diminish with the aim to 
integrate their members in the institutions that represent all Amsterdam citizens (Berger et al, 
2001, pp. 44-45). Next to the efforts of these minatory advisory boards, mosque organisations 
play an increasingly important role as a meeting place and carry out social and 
cultural/ethnical activities (Waardenburg, 2001, p. 21; van der Sar et al, 2008, van Heelsum, 
2004). As a result, mosques contribute to integration and political participation of their 
visitors (Dautzenberg & van Westerlaak, 2007, p. 13; de Jong, 2007, p. 24: Berger et al, 2001, 
p. 19-20). Consequently, a strong connection between (local) government and mosque 
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organisations may be relevant when addressing integration and participation issues (Canatan 
et al, 2005, p. 24).  
2.4 Elites 
The elite of (mosque) organisations can be the source of trust for their community members. 
Elites concern a small group of persons that rule or influence a greater number of persons. A 
political elite can be defined as ‘a group of people, corporations, political parties and/or any 
other kind of civil society organization who manage and organize government and all the 
manifestations of political power’ (Vergara, 2013, p. 32). This definition would fit the boards 
of mosque organisations as well, in particular for the organisations that not only provide a 
worshipping place but also act as civil society organisation.  
For the purpose of this study, elites are defined as a small group of persons who hold power 
over a larger group of persons, in non-political organisations. They have decision-making 
powers in the field they carry responsibility for. The density of the network is relevant for the 
mate van power elites have. Heemskerk and associates consider members of boards with three 
or more interlocks as big linkers. They form ‘important nodes in the network along which 
information and organisational expertise are distributed’ (Heemskerk et al, 2002, p. 114). Big 
linkers hold a crucial position in the network, contributing to the cohesion of their networks 
(Heemskerk et al, 2002, p. 114). The density of their network is important for the social trust 
of its members (Berger et al, 2001, p. 20).  
If the big linkers have known each other before their connection in boards of organisation, 
e.g. when they were part of the same society, were fellow students or relatives, their network 
is also known as ‘the old boys’ network’ (Heemskerk & Fennema, 2009, p. 810). Board 
interlocks contribute to the old boys’ networks but do not define them (Heemskerk & 
Fennema, 2009, p. 811). The nature of the relationships of members of these networks 
changes. The members do not only meet as colleagues or members of the same boards, but are 
considered as key persons in the elite who meet in formal and informal meetings and 
exchange information that can advantage the persons involved (Heemskerk & Fennema, 
2009, p. 821). They often act as spokespersons for their organisations, or are invited to 
respond to important events. With knowledge, information, authority, organisational and 
decision making skills, a strong network of relevant persons and organisations, and an open 
mind, the elite of the organisations can be the source of trust of its community (van der Sar et 
al, 2008, p. 23). Note that also the composition of the board can play a role in the trust that 
their followers or members have: an underrepresentation of the younger generations can 
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generate frustration which can lead to disassociation of them, with the risk that they seek 
sanctuary in radical organisations that have (Roex et al, 2010, p. 32).  
In migrant communities within cities, (in)formal leaders of civic organisations can play an 
important role in connecting actors from a diversity of backgrounds. They are, at least 
according to some scholars, able to break down barriers, extend beyond boundaries and 
understand when to intervene in such a way that the interests of all actors within the domain 
are taken into account (van Heelsum, 2001, p. 30; van den Brink, et al, 2012, pp. 92-94, 99-
100, 106). The social capital, developed by these key persons is of substantial added value for 
their own position and that of the organisations they represent (Heemskerk, 2002, p. 124).  
2.5 Interlocks 
‘Trust cannot travel among networks unless there are links among these networks’ (Fennema, 
2004, p. 433). Social capital is present within the civil organisations and between 
organisations: interlocked directorates, when two or more organisations are linked through 
one person who is member of their boards (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 713).  
Interlocks can enhance the distribution of information, development of mutual trust, and 
internal solidarity. Interlocking directorates between two or more organisations also add value 
by the distribution of best practices (Heemskerk et al, 2002, p. 114). Also, experience and 
knowledge from one organisation can be of use for the other organisation. In this way, 
networks of civic engagement form a part of the social capital of communities. (Putnam, 
1993, p. 175). For this study this means that the social capital of ethnic communities is both 
located within the communities, and between organisations by interlocking directorates, i.e. 
the membership of two ethnic organisations by one person (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 713). 
The role of the double membership can have various. Double functions on a primary level are 
those where a leader of an organisation is also leader of another organisation. On a secondary 
level, the double function exists of one person who is member of the board of two or more 
organisations (Heemskerk, 2002, p. 115).  
Interlocking directorates of voluntary associations play a crucial role in the formation of a 
civic community because they create permanent horizontal communication channels between 
different organisations. They are able to create levels of communication and levels of trust 
because the interlocked organisations have direct access to each other through an interlocking 
director (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 705).  
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3 Moroccan Muslims and their organisations 
In order to understand the networks of the Moroccan religious organisations in Amsterdam 
this chapter gives an overview of the development of Moroccan religious organisations in 
Amsterdam, and the way they are organised, with special attention to the imam, the spiritual 
leader of mosques.  
3.1 Moroccan religious organisations in Amsterdam 
Approximately 50 percent of all Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands live in one of the four 
big cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (Schmeets & van Mensvoort, 
2015, p. 5). The city of Amsterdam has the highest number of Muslim migrants of the 
Netherlands, with more than 100 mosques (Scheffer et al, 2012, Schippers & Wenneker, 
2014). The Turkish and Moroccan migrants form the largest communities. In 2015, the 
72.078 citizens are migrants from Morocco of which 61.119 have both Moroccan and Dutch 
nationality. The Moroccan migrants form almost 9 percent of the total population of the city 
of Amsterdam (Bureau Onderzoek + Statistiek, 2015, p. 57). 
The Moroccan Muslim community is less organised compared to other ethnic communities 
(Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p. 53) and although there are several umbrella organisations, there 
is no umbrella organisation that covers all Moroccan mosque organisations, neither on a 
national nor on a local level. Reflecting on the establishment of the organisations of 
Moroccan migrants, the fragmentation of the community can be better understood. Since the 
1950s, labour migrants from Morocco were attracted to the Netherlands: men, mostly without 
their families, were given a temporary work permit. The majority of them settled in 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (Maussen, 2009, p. 121). The group of labour 
migrants from Morocco included persons who felt abandoned in the home country due to their 
political interests (Bouras, 2012, p. 131). In the 1960s, many labour migrants turned to 
initiatives of Dutch natives that were established to support foreign workers in finding their 
way in the Netherlands (van Amersfoort & van Heelsum, 2007, p. 245). These initiatives had 
no particular ethnic or religious background and were focused on societal participation, i.e. 
the prevention of isolation of the ‘guest workers’ (Bouras, 2012, p. 224). At that time, there 
were only few provisional initiatives for mosques; in the 1970s the City of Amsterdam made 
available small subsidies for initiatives for places of prayer (Maussen, 2009, p. 129).  
The first Moroccan mosque in Amsterdam was established in 1974, using the premises of a 
church (Sunier et al, 2016, p. 11). The boards of the first Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam 
were composed on the basis of personal relationships rather than by formal elections. 
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Moroccan mosque organisations in the Netherlands followed the common practice of the 
home country, where the foundation of mosques was considered to be a local matter without 
instructions from a central organisation (van Heelsum, 2001, p. 2). Also, the first Moroccan 
mosques in the Netherlands were established solely as places of worship, like in the home 
country. However, many developed into a meeting place with a scope beyond religion, partly 
as a result of competition with non-religious ethnic organisations (Maussen, 2007, p. 12). The 
mosque organisations were successful in attracting followers as they had easier access to 
migrants compared with the initiatives of Dutch organisations to help migrants in their 
integration process (Butter & El Kaddouri, 2016, p. 8). ‘Mosques often became the centre of 
networks of migrant organisations and communities’ (Maussen, 2007, p. 12).  
Many of the early mosques in Amsterdam were located in buildings with another function 
before, such as a catholic church, a school, a garage or sports hall, or even in former factories 
or offices. The first generation of Moroccan migrants established the mosques, invested in the 
mosque organisations and played an active role in the organisation of the mosques and its 
activities. Many of the early board members are still playing an active role, either as board 
member or in a support position for the activities that are developed for the members and 
visitors of the mosque. The later generations of mosque members and visitors have higher 
education qualifications, not speak Arabic at the same level as their parents, and have a 
stronger connection with the Netherlands than with Morocco (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor 
het Regeringsbeleid, 2006, p. 47; Sunier et al, 2016, pp. 10-11). Although the older generation 
may accommodate the younger visitors, they are at the same time hesitant to incorporate 
young persons in their boards. It is not likely that young persons apply for a board function as 
this is considered ‘old school’ procedures by young persons and they are finding new ways to 
shape their influence sphere (Loader et al, 2014, p. 145). If they do, they are not always 
welcome as older board members may perceive the younger ones as more orthodox and more 
open to radicalist concepts interpretations (Butter, 2011, p. 37; Berger, 2012, p. 18). 
The mosques were often ethnically segregated from each other, providing religious services in 
the language and rituals of the originating country and even of the region of origin 
(Waardenburg, 2001, p. 17). This is still the case for the Moroccan mosques, with one 
exception. The Blue Mosque, which was established in 2008, can be considered as a ‘Dutch’ 
mosque with Dutch as language for the religious services, or translated to Dutch when Arabic 
spoken. Most of the Moroccan mosques are located in the western part of Amsterdam; this is 
the part of the city where many Moroccan migrants have settled. 
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The development of multi-function mosques, particularly with large new buildings, have at 
times been perceived as a confirmation that there is no willingness to integrate in the Dutch 
community, or that the mosque organisation deliberately keeps their visitors away from the 
Western world. The multi-function mosque may very well serve as ‘safe haven’ and gain the 
trust of their visitors and stimulate them to integrate and participate in the country of 
residence (Maussen, 2007, pp. 12-14).  
At least in the various descriptions of the tasks of the mosques, according to their registration 
file in the Trade Register of the Chamber for Commerce, many mosques explicitly 
acknowledge a task to help their visitors to learn more about the culture, habits, and laws of 
the Netherlands. This is coherent with the common understanding of the countries of origin 
with a Muslim background: ‘religion is not simply a personal matter; it has profound political 
and social implication’ (Ball & Dagger, 2006, pp. 260-262). However, an earlier study 
indicates that mosque organisations are hardly open to others as a result of the way they are 
structured and financed. Organisations may initiate activities for youth and other specific 
groups, but there is hardly any connection between similar organisations of other mosques; 
there also consists a huge gap between older and younger visitors. (Slootman & Tillie, 2006). 
Moroccan migrants likely are scarcely engaged with religious associations, either as a 
member or as a participant/visitor (Phalet & van der Wall, 2004). Specifically for Amsterdam, 
another study indicates that migrants are less connected with each other than migrants from 
other countries (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p. 60).  
3.1.1 Organisation, administration and finance 
Since the 1980s the procedures for setting up a mosque were improved by subsidies to 
Muslim associations and other facilities. Many local initiatives were granted by a mix of 
officials, experts and of representatives of the Muslim organisations. Also, Islamic centres 
have been built with the help of external funding, from the countries of origin, such as the 
Muslim World League which is under Saudi control. Where this is the case, diplomatic 
representatives of the countries of origin, i.e. ambassadors, are usually member of the boards 
(Allievi, 2009, p. 21).  
Most of the mosques are associations and foundations which are both legal identities, 
established with a certain objective. They are both allowed to make profits with their 
activities; however, the profits must be used to serve the objective of the organisation. It is 
prohibited to reimburse that to persons of the organisations, including founders, board 
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members and others involved in the organisation. Foundations do not have members. The 
boards of foundations do not have to keep their constituency informed about changes in the 
organisations or its policy. The financial and decision-making authorities of each board 
member are registered in the constitution of the foundation and can be found in the Trade 
Register of the Chamber of Commerce. Associations have registered members. They form the 
highest decision-making organ of the association. The boards of associations are obliged to 
organise board elections. The members of associations may apply for board positions and 
have voting power. 
A number of the mosques have a separate entity, either a foundation or an association, that 
serve to oversee social, cultural and educational activities (van Heelsum, 2001, p. 22). The 
decision to establish a separate institution within the mosque organisation may be that a 
variety of activities including those for youngsters and women do not fit in the religious rules 
of the mosques. Also, the establishment of a separate institution may be subsidy driven as 
some subsidies are not available for religious activities (de Jong, 2007, p. 24). 
The mosque organisations are led by boards, consisting of a chair, a treasurer, and general 
memberships. The religious services, such as the Friday prayer, are led by the imam, the 
religious leader of the mosque. The imam is not a member of the board of the organisation. 
His position will be discussed in the next paragraph. Boards of ethnical organisations can 
serve as role model for its followers, linking pin regarding integration of its members or 
visitors, and can articulate the needs and preference of its constituency. (Berger et al, 2001, 
pp. 3-4). 
3.1.2 Spiritual leaders 
The spiritual leaders or imams are responsible for most of the religious events in the mosques. 
They are also deployed for religious education in the mosque, such as Quran lessons and 
education in the Arabic language. Volunteers assist in religious activities, as teacher or to 
support the imam during services (van der Sar, Lombo-Visser, & Boender, 2008, p. 32). Also 
board members may carry out pastoral care (van der Sar et al, 2008, p. 34). 
As there were no educated religious leaders, the first mosques requested the Moroccan 
government to assist in attracting imams to the Netherlands, especially during the Ramadan, 
the fasting period in which many religious services are being held. As many mosque members 
were not happy with the services by these Moroccan state-appointed imams, they started to 
recruit imams through their own network (Boender, 2007, p. 47). Many mosques were not 
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able to fulfil imam vacancies and had to fall back on ‘amateurs’, including persons without a 
stay or working permit (Douwes, 2009, pp. 93-94).  
The position of imams of the mosques has been a topic in the debate on integration and 
participation in the Netherlands, especially after the media mentioned the dangerous role of 
imams recruited abroad (Douwes, 2009, p. 93). There is a public fear for imams who are 
recruited from the country of origin (Allievi, 2009, p. 81). In the case of Moroccan mosques, 
there are hardly any imams from Morocco active in mosques in Amsterdam; imams often 
come from Syria or Egypt (Douwes, 2009, p. 93). They were incorporated in Moroccan 
mosque as they were able to communicate in the Arabic language. Imams were invisible and 
distrusted regarding the messages they would spread through sermons and religious lessons 
(Boender, 2007, p. 54). Media covered the alleged unwillingness of imams to comply with 
Dutch norms and values, including handshakes with women (de Leeuw & van Wichelen, 
2012, p. 199). Other examples are radical and intolerant statements by visiting imams10, and 
the statements of imams regarding homosexuality11. The fear for incorporation of radical 
foreign imams was one of the two reasons why the Dutch integration exam for newcomers 
was set up. With the integration course, religious clergy and foreign brides learn to understand 
the Dutch culture, before they may apply for Dutch visa. (de Leeuw & van Wichelen, 2012, p. 
200). The integration exams were implemented in 2006.  
Due to their considered central position in the mosque, the question remains whether imams 
can play an active role in the social/religious development of their audience while they are not 
familiar themselves with the Dutch language and culture, despite the mandatory integration 
exam (Van der Sar et al, 2008, p. 24). The debate on the qualifications of imams from abroad 
has led to the call of the national parliament for dedicated education for imams (Fennema & 
Tillie, 2001, p. 723) that goes beyond the mandatory integration course. Feasibility studies on 
the request of the national government were initiated in 1993 (Boender, 2007, p. 48). In 2005 
and 2006, two universities and one college have started imam studies. The lack of a sufficient 
number of students has led to the closedown of two of these studies (Boender, 2014, p. 26; 
Berger, 2012, p. 27).  
Although imams are not a member of the boards of a mosque, their informal influence as 
reader of the Quran and religious leader cannot be denied. From a sociological point of view, 
religion is one of the most effective ways to keep migrants attached to their home country 
                                                 
10 http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/23996582/__Haatimam_op_tournee__.html  
11 http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/-imam-legaliseert-geweld-tegen-homo-s~a601694/  
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(Sunier et al, 2016, p. 4). The study of Boender regarding the position of the imam in the 
Netherlands learned that imams may have a certain authority on the basis of his religious 
knowledge and education through which he can influence the moral concepts and actions of 
the visitors of the mosque (Boender, 2007, p. 285). However, this authority is limited. The 
visitors of religious services do not represent the ‘average’ Muslim migrant in Amsterdam 
(Douwes, 2009, p. 89). It must be taken into account that the imam predominantly lectures in 
religious services where women do not participate and that young people; the second and 
third generation migrants do not visit religious services with the same frequency as their 
fathers. (Van der Sar et al, 2008, p. 42; Boender, 2007, p. 288; Berger, 2012, p. 16). Despite 
the fact that young people may not be loyal mosque visitors, religion increasingly serves as 
identification for young people (de Graaff, 2009, p. 68). This feeds the fear that these young 
people may be interested in radicalist ideas, whether or not stimulated by the spiritual leader.  
The extent to which imams can formally decide is expected to be absent or limited as they are 
not a board member of the mosques. There is no evidence on the density of the networks of 
imams, and their names do not appear in the board member records of mosque organisations 
in the Trade Register. Their religious leadership is limited to the mosque where imams 
preach. External (religious) leadership is carried out by the mosque boards, not by the imam 
(Boender, 2007, p. 295).  
3.2 Umbrella organisations  
The Moroccan community in the Netherlands includes a number of umbrella organisations, 
several for each stream and ethnical origin, and also regionally organised. 
In an early stage of the establishment of Moroccan mosques in the Netherlands, an umbrella 
organisation named Amicales was set up (van Amersfoort & van Heelsum, 2007, p. 246). 
This ‘Amicales des Ouvriers et commercants Marocains’ was an initiative of the Moroccan 
government to ensure a connectedness in the social and cultural field between the home 
country and Moroccans in Western European countries (Sunier, 2014, p. 2). The members of 
Amicales enjoyed advantages like priority listing at the consulates, attractive procurement of 
building lots in Morocco, and the reimbursement of costs of human remains transport to 
Morocco (Bouras, 2012, p. 132). Although many Moroccan migrants became member of 
Amicales (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1977, p. 18), there were opposite voices of other 
representatives of the Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands12. They argued that the 
Moroccan government used the Amicales’ membership to control their citizens living abroad 
                                                 
12 http://leiden.courant.nu/issue/NLC/1976-03-05/edition/0/page/13  
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(Sunier et al, 2016, p. 2). The inland security service of the Netherlands supported this 
suspicion and concluded in 1977 that, although the Amicales organisation stands for 
representation of interests of Moroccan migrants, it also served as a control mechanism for 
the Moroccan government to oversee the (political) activities of their citizens abroad 
(Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1977, pp. 16-19). Other early representatives of the 
Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands at that time included the Committee of Moroccan 
Labourers in the Netherlands (in Dutch abbreviated as KMAN13), and the Moroccan Labour 
Committee that focused on Moroccan migrants in the Rotterdam area (Bouras, 2012, p. 130). 
The organisations’ focus was on labour rights and on human rights in the home country (van 
Heelsum, 2001, p. 16).  
The Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands (abbreviated as UMMON) 
claimed to represent the majority of the Moroccan mosque organisations in the Netherlands. 
In the early 1990 this included 90 mosque organisations (Bouras, 2012, p. 172). In 2000, this 
number was decreased to 50 mosque organisations (Bouras, 2012, p. 176). The UMMAO, the 
Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in Amsterdam, was one of the members of 
UMMON (Douwes, 2009, p. 91).After the criticism on the tied strengths of Amicales with the 
Moroccan government, in 1993 UMMON was accused of being dictated by the Moroccan 
government organisations (Rabbae, 1993, p. 14; Tweede Kamer, 2004, p. 96). This even led 
to parliamentary questions about the influence of the Moroccan government in the 
Netherlands (Bouras, 2012, p. 170).  
There is no evidence that UMMON is still functioning as umbrella organisation: there is no 
information by the organisation on the internet, nor a registration in the Chamber of 
Commerce. The report of the Scientific Board for Government Policies on religion in the 
public domain referred to a representative of UMMON who explained the horizontal 
governance structure of the umbrella organisation and the absence of formal memberships 
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2006, p. 122). There is no evidence 
whether the source for this reference is trustworthy. A recent media message referred to 
UMMON as one of the initiators of a peace manifestation ‘against attacks’. The list of 
initiators that was published included a total of 21 ethnic/religious organisations14.   
CMO, Contact body Muslims and Government is a national organisation, founded in 2001 by 
six Muslim organisations of various backgrounds, and acknowledged by the national 
                                                 
13 Komitee Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland 
14 http://www.paxvoorvrede.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/vredesmanifestatie-tegen-aanslagen  
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government as counterpart for Muslims in the Netherlands since 2004. The Dutch national 
government had a strong preference - despite the diversity in Muslim streams and 
backgrounds – to have a single organisation representing the Muslim community. The CMO 
claims to represent the majority (84 percent) of all mosque organisations in the Netherlands 
(CMO, 2015).   
An important condition for the acknowledgement as spokes partner on behalf of the Muslim 
community in the Netherlands is the duty to represent the Muslim religion including the 
various streams within15. Shortly after the acknowledgement of CMO as intermediate between 
Muslims in the Netherlands and the government, the Minister of Justice decided to also 
acknowledge a second party, the Contact Groep Islam (CGI) as CMO and CGI they could not 
meet the Minister’s request to jointly represent their grassroots. (Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011; 
Phalet & van der Wall, 2004). Despite the acknowledgement of two organisations as spokes 
partner, the Minister’s preference was to integrate both organisations to again have one point 
of contact with the Muslim community in the Netherlands (Minister van Vreemdelingenzaken 
en Integratie, 2005). This has never been set in motion. The acknowledgement of CMO and 
CGI has not been actualised, although various representatives of Muslim organisations take 
the floor after the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ shootings in Paris in 2015. The Dutch vice premier and the 
Minister of Security and Justice organised a meeting with representatives of various Muslim 
communities16, but did not favour CMO and CGI as the sole spokes partners with the 
Netherlands Government.  
At an early stage, the connection of CMO with the national government was criticised. As 
Shadid and Van Koningsveld stated in a newspaper article that the call to CMO to condemn 
terrorism publicly was in contravention with the Dutch Constitution (Shadid & van 
Koningsveld, 2004). They claim that the usual way to discuss non-religious issues is by 
politics and the particular institutions that serve ethnical minorities.  
CMO claims to represent 380 mosque organisations in the Netherlands17, but no evidence is 
available regarding the influence CMO has towards its members. Moreover, in the media 
young Muslims complained that their voice is not heard, which was also a concern of 
                                                 
15 https://www.nd.nl/nieuws/politiek/verdonk-erkent-moslimorgaan-nog-niet.65910.lynkx; 
http://www.digibron.nl/search/detail/012dc56c4d4c106dea9d3eb8/pvda-en-cda-cmo-niet-
representatief  
16 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2015/01/09/verklaring-bijeenkomst-moslimorganisaties-9-
januari-2015  
17 See the introduction at http://cmoweb.nl/over-ons/  
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members of parliament in the aftermath of the killing of Theo van Gogh (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 2005).  
According to the listing of the former Ministry of Spatial Planning and the Environment 
(VROM), CGI includes three umbrella organisations (Ministerie van VROM, 2004). There is 
no updated information about the number of members of CGI, neither whether the three 
umbrella organisations are still member. There is no information as to whether the Moroccan 
mosque organisations in Amsterdam are member of CGI or the underlying umbrella 
organisations. CGI was further criticised that it poses itself as representative of liberal Islam 
in the Netherlands, including Ahmadis and Turkish Alevites who did not feel attached to 
CMO. Its constituency is rather small (de Koning, 2005, p. 45).  
At the time of the publication of this listing, CGI and CMO were part of IPO18, the 
consultation organ of the Ministry of VROM (Ministerie van VROM, 2004, p. 11). On the 
internet, the only name that appeared in relation to CGI is the name of the chair. The 
information may be outdated as no recent records have been identified.  
The Board of Moroccan mosques in the Netherlands19 (RMMN) includes the Union of 
Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam and its surrounding areas20, the Moroccan Mosques Union 
Midden-Holland21, the Limburg Islamic Board22 and the Board of Moroccan Mosques in 
Utrecht and surrounding areas23. Not all Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam are member of the 
Union of Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam. RMMN claims to be a political neutral 
organisation, with no distribution of political ideas of a political party (RMMN, 2016). Yet, a 
cartoon has been drawn on the request of RMMN which shows politician Geert Wilders as a 
toddler screaming ‘less less’24. This cartoon serves as a counterweight to cartoons Wilders 
wanted to exhibit in the broadcasting time of political parties. This action of RMMN does not 
really fit with its statement to keep distance from the political world and from party politics.  
It seems logical that umbrella organisations function as ‘keeping the family together’ 
institutions, although they are also seen as independently functioning organisations (Sunier, 
2014, p. 11). They have or at least claim to have a dense network. However, due to the 
                                                 
18 Dutch abbreviation for: Inter-Islamic Platform Overheid 
19 Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Nederland (RMMN) 
20 Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Amsterdam en Omstreken 
21 Marokkaanse Moskeeën Unie Midden Holland 
22 Limburgse Islamitische Raad 
23 Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën Utrecht e.o. 
24 http://nieuws.nl/algemeen/20150617/moskeen-brengen-cartoon-over-wilders-uit/; 
http://www.telegraaf.nl/feed/24167980/__Cartoon_over_Wilders_uitgebracht__.html;  
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fragmentation of the Moroccan religious community even in the city of Amsterdam, there can 
be doubt about the level of (political) trust they can transfer to their members.  
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4 Network analysis 
Network analysis is about the interdependence and flows of influence of individuals, groups, 
and institutions. The position of actors in the network, the density of a network and the 
interconnectivity show who is well-positioned to influence (Lazer, 2011, p. 62). The structure 
of a network can provide insights in social and political behaviour and reveal how close 
persons in the network are and their dependency of each other’s connections (Ward et al, 
2011, p. 256): it may be that particular persons do not have a dense network but that their 
network includes a big linker, i.e. a person with multiple connections on a high level.  
 
Figure 1, Network of Moroccan mosque/social/cultural organisations in Amsterdam and umbrella organisations 
The density of the networks indicates the degree of civil involvement of the members. If the 
networks are dense, there is a likely social trust and the members of the network will jointly 
contribute to their common interest (Berger et al, 2001, p. 20). Next to the density, also 
strength in relations, centrality, equality, interaction, resource and information flows can 
contribute to the evaluation of the quality of a network if the necessary data is available.  
Network data can suggest the probability of relations between individuals increase when they 
have more similarities in characteristics (Hof et al, 2002, p. 1091). This stresses the 
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importance of collecting information of the individuals that are included in the network 
analysis, as has been done for this study. Also, unobserved characteristics can be relevant for 
a proper network analysis (Hof et al, 2002, p. 1091), when there are indirect connections 
between individuals i.e. through another individual. However, the less active a network is, the 
more difficult to discover the individuals in the network and their interconnectivity (Krebs, 
2002, p. 49).  
If individuals have only small networks with a limited number of nodes, then it comes to the 
quality and nature of these connections in order to understand the interconnectivity. Different 
kinds of networks dominate different arenas (Ward et al, 2011, p. 257). Despite locally dense 
clusters, out-centred contacts could easily be reached through a small number of bridging 
connections (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  
Fennema has focused on the horizontal links in relations, and included the vertical relations in 
civic communities. He has defined a number of indicators of social capital of ethnic groups: 
organisational density (the number of organisations of an ethnic group divided by the total 
number of members of the group) and institutional completeness (the access to all necessary 
services provided or produced by the group). Furthermore, he defines the connectivity of the 
networks and argues that the denser and more connected the network, the greater the 
communication efficiency is (Fennema, 2004, pp. 440-442). 
With the help of online social networks, such as LinkedIn show the scope of connections of 
individuals. A blessing or a curse of the online social networks is that ‘news’ travels fast: 
‘they accelerate the transmission of information and they are helpful to establish and 
reinforce “identities” and common frames of reference’ (Ward et al, 2011, p. 246). 
Reviewing the listing on LinkedIn Profiles it is always visible how to how many persons a 
member is linked, as long as the LinkedIn user has not limit the access to his inner circle. 
When reaching the stage of being linked with more than 500 persons, the counting just shows 
500+ linked members. Whether a political leader or a small shop owner, as of this number, 
everyone is equal, with regards to the opinions about the size of the network.  
The network analysis explores the connections of board members of Moroccan mosque 
organisations in Amsterdam. The following steps have been taken in order to create a data set 
of the interlocking members and organisations.  
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4.1 Identification of Moroccan religious organisations 
There is not a single source or database that includes an overview of mosque organisations 
and their boards, although some databases aim to get this overview. The former ‘Moskee Data 
Base’, for example, included names and addresses of 442 mosques in the Netherlands in 2002 
and was the basis of the research of Van Heelsum on Islam in the Netherlands (van Heelsum, 
2004). The founder or owner of the database aimed to show the increase in the number of 
mosques since the 1970s25. There is no proof that the data of this website is complete and 
correct. The Mighealth.net26 site presents itself as the ‘European database for professionals, 
officials, researchers and representatives of migrants and ethnic minorities, to provide access 
to a dynamic developing source of knowledge’. It contains a ‘Dutch portal’ with a listing of 
Turkish, Moroccan, Surinam and Muslim organisations in the Netherlands. This portal 
includes some umbrella organisations. Based on own research it is unlikely that this database 
is complete; there is no indication that the information provided in the portal is up-to-date.  
Various umbrella organisations, such as CMO, have websites and refer to member listings, 
however the internet links to this information do not lead to that information or are absent. 
Only at UMMON, a listing of their members, i.e. mosque organisations in the province of 
Noord-Holland, is available. The information of UMMON did not lead to a complete 
overview of all Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam as not all of them are member of 
UMMON.27.  
4.2 Creating the data base 
In the absence of a valid and complete database, a new database has been set up, divided in 
two sections: organisations and board members. First, the names of the members were 
collected both from the internet (news and social media sites) and the Trade Register of the 
Chamber of Commerce in the Netherlands. The data set had a column ‘origin of data’: trade 
register, social media, and other online (news) media sites. As the collected data could be out 
of date, e.g. based on news articles from many years ago still available online, the Trade 
Register was used as basis as its data on board members and organisations is up-to-date. The 
                                                 
25 http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/broeikasjes-voor-extreem-rechts~a633953/  
26 http://mighealth.net/nl/index.php/Lijst_van_Turkse,_Marokkaanse,_Surinaamse_en_Moslim_Organisaties 
_in_Nederland#Moslim_organisaties_in_Nederland, retrieved on 27 March 2016 
27 Many other attempts of setting up a site have thus been identified, but they did not provide complete information, links to 
sub-sites did not work or the data was outdated: Islaam.nu, 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=zRkdXje9C99c.kb1IVZBxmV3I&hl=en_US 
Listing by Taâluf mosque in Purmerend, Noord-Holland, http://www.taaluf.nl/over-taaluf/lijst-van-moskeeen-in-
nederland.html Moskeewijzer, http://www.moskeewijzer.nl/b.php?lang=NL&plaats=Amsterdam&map= 
NH&gps1=52.370569&gps2=4.862137&gps3=12, Mosque finder, http://www.mosque-finder.com/ 
Listing of Moroccan mosques in Noord-Holland, http://www.rvmm.nl/1678207.htm 
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organisations at least have the duty to provide the Chamber of Commerce with any changes in 
the registration of their organisation28.  
Only the members registered at the time of the research29 are included in the data set. The data 
includes full name, country and place of birth, age, gender, position in the board, year of entry 
in the board, occupational status, memberships of various organisations, and appearances on 
the internet (frequency and types). The data serves two purposes. The first is to check whether 
the persons subject to this study are not confused with others with the same name. The second 
is to learn more from the persons investigated in order to understand their network. 
 
 
Figure 2, Process of data collection 
                                                 
28 http://www.kvk.nl/inschrijven-en-wijzigen/wijziging-doorgeven/functionaris-inschrijven-wijzigen-of-
uitschrijven/  
29 Retrieved from the Chamber of Commerce site from July – December 2015 (http://www.kvk.nl/) 
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In the Google search engine the following search words were used: ‘moslim’, ‘Islam’, 
‘moskee’, ‘mosque’, ‘Muslim’, ‘buurt’, ‘Marokkaans’. The results of this first search included 
a number of organisations that may be related to the Moroccan mosque organisations in 
Amsterdam, but in the name search on board members, no link could be found. The identified 
organisations either lack a link with the board members or do not provide sufficient 
information that may indicate a possible connection30.  
Each Moroccan mosque organisation that was identified through the internet search was 
compared with the online trade register of the Chamber of Commerce. In total 28 
organisations were registered. These 28 organisations have a total of 135 registered members 
in the Trade Register. Additional information on the organisations was retrieved from Google 
search. Additional information on these registered members was retrieved from a Google 
search and by entering their names in the search engines of the social media sites LinkedIn 
and Facebook. As five organisations share the same address, their relationship was further 
investigated, even in the absence of interlocks on a person’s level.  
Based on the information from both the Trade Register and the previous internet search, these 
organisations have been classified as mosque, umbrella organisation or social/cultural 
organisation. The distinction is relevant for the network analysis. As mosque and 
social/cultural organisation could be formally separate identities, on an informal basis they 
could be one organisation, which should explain possible interlocks between the organisation. 
For the classification of the organisations, the coding in the Trade Register was taken into 
account but was not decisive since this did not match with the purpose of the organisations 
exactly. All mosques received the code M#, followed by a number. In the Trade Register, 
they are coded as 94911, described as ‘religious organisation’. When we follow that listing, 
also an umbrella organisation (CMO) and a social/cultural organisation are considered to be a 
religious organisation. In the database created for this study, they are not coded as religious 
organisation, but as respectively L# for umbrella organisation, and S# for social/cultural 
organisation. The social/cultural organisations are listed in the Trade Register as local welfare 
organisations, other ideological organisations, and other representation of interests. With the 
                                                 
30 30. These organisations include African Muslim Congress, De groene Moslim, De Moslimkrant, Landelijk 
Islamitisch Vrouwen Netwerk, Moskee Al-Kabir, Moslim in Dialoog, Moslim Motorclub, Moslim Politieke 
Partij, Moslim Vandaag, Moslimama, Moslimkrant, Moslimliga, Moslimomroep, Moslims in NL, Muslima 
Matters, Stichting Al-Noer voor Moslim Vrouwen, Stichting Islam Media, Stichting Islamitische School 
Amsterdam, Stichting Maroc_NL, Stichting Maroc-Stars, Stichting Nederlandse Moslim Associatie, and Trust 
Europe Nederland. 
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exception of umbrella organisation CMO, the umbrella organisations are mentioned only as 
‘other organisations’ or as ‘other umbrella organisations’ in the Trade Register.  
According to Trade Register Law 200731 on the privacy of data in the Trade register, the 
home addresses of board members and others registered are only available to public 
administration, police, lawyers and attorneys. With the available data, we cannot know that 
the board members of Moroccan mosque organisations all live in Amsterdam or elsewhere.  
A problem in the data collection was the spelling of the names. The basis was formed by the 
way names of the board members were spelled in the Trade Register as this registration 
follows the writing of the names in identity documents (ID or passport). However, the way 
the names were spelled in some cases on the internet, could differ. The extra information 
collected could provide evidence that he or she was indeed the same person, despite the 
difference in the name spelling.  
The availability of a list of ages or birth dates of the board members helped the search on 
Facebook and LinkedIn, particularly when there were several persons with the same name. 
Even though there was not always a picture available, the curricula vitae and interests could 
give a clue on whether the information found, referred to the board member subject to 
research.  
In theory, the date of registration – and indirectly the number of years that persons are a 
member of the board – could reveal the degree of involvement of the board members. 
However, it does not give full insight in the exact number of years of board membership. 
Some persons may be playing a role for many years now but with the current administration, 
this is not visible. If a board member resigned and was re-elected later, this was not on record 
in the Trade Register. Without these historical records, one depends on information in the 
media to find out the length of the involvement in years as there are no dedicated sources that 
can provide these data.  
There is no valid data available with respect to when migrants moved to the Netherlands as 
there is no public access to the citizens register of the City of Amsterdam. If access was 
allowed, these data could have been useful to investigate the relationship between the number 
of years that persons live in the Netherlands and their connections. 
 
                                                 
31 Official name of the legislation: Handelsregisterwet 2007 
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5 Results 
The results of the network analysis are divided in two sections: organisations and persons. 
The logic applied here is that in some cases, organisations are linked through (mutual) formal 
memberships, e.g. a mosque organisation being member of an umbrella organisation. The 
board members of both organisations may not have a direct connection with each other. It 
may very well be that the board members do not feel personally attached or even oppose to 
the membership of the own organisation with an umbrella organisation. 
5.1 Organisations 
The organisations can be divided into three groups: 18 mosque organisations, four 
social/cultural organisations, and six umbrella organisations. All organisations are either an 
association or as a foundation. Eight mosques have been registered as an association, the 
others as foundation. It is not clear why some organisations are established as foundation and 
others as an association but the formal organisation has consequences for the board. Board 
members of foundations are ‘elected’ or accepted by the board, while in associations members 
of the association decide on the composition of the board through elections. Foundations do 
not need to set up a membership administration. Informal meetings suggest however that 
many mosque organisations, whether or not an association, have a membership registration: 
this is the easiest way to collect money and to reach its adherents for meetings and events.  
As the scope of the study was limited to the city of Amsterdam, all mosque and social/cultural 
organisations are located in Amsterdam. Three out of seven umbrella organisations are not 
located in Amsterdam. They have been taken into account in this study, because of their 
umbrella function with its potential connection of one mosque with another when this is not 
directly the case. Both the CMO and CGI are located outside Amsterdam, as well as the 
Board of Moroccan Mosques in the Netherlands32.  
5.1.1 Overview 
Figure 3 shows all organisations that are subject to this study. On an organisational level, i.e. 
not by person, only two of the six umbrella organisations are linked. This is on the basis of the 
membership of umbrella L04 to L03.  
                                                 
32 In Dutch: Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Nederland 
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Figure 3, Network of Moroccan religious organisations in Amsterdam 
The majority of the mosques and social/cultural organisations in Amsterdam are according to 
this analysis not linked with an umbrella organisation. It could be that the ‘lone’ organisations 
in the overview are linked with the other umbrella organisations, but no data is available.  
As umbrella organisation L06 shares the same address as mosque organisation M08, it would 
be expected that M08 is member of the umbrella organisation. In an informal meeting with 
staff of the mosque organisation, they denied that they housed the umbrella organisation, and 
mentioned that the umbrella organisation for Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam is located 
elsewhere. Umbrella organisation L06 does not provide information on their members. 
As displayed in Figure 3, also umbrella organisations L05 and L06 are connected, according 
to the information on the website of L05. No other connections have been identified for these 
organisations. 
5.1.2 Interlock: umbrella under the umbrella 
The interlocks of umbrella organisations are identified for four out of six organisations. Both 
CMO and CGI do not have any formal connection with (board members of) the selected 
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mosque and social/cultural organisations. Also, no interlocks can be observed through media 
such as news articles or social media.  
The umbrella organisation L04 is member of umbrella organisation L03. They are both 
organisations with a regional scope; their names include ‘Noord-Holland’. Regarding 
organisation L04, it was not possible to acquire a list of members. Umbrella organisation L03 
provides a list of members. There is no evidence whether this list is up-to-date. From the 
information provided on the internet, there is no hierarchical structure within the members of 
umbrella organisation L03. There is no information available regarding the access of board 
members of umbrella organisation L04 to the umbrella organisation L03. As the link between 
the two organisations is not through a board member but an application, it is expected that the 
members of the one organisation benefit from the other organisation’s network and vice versa. 
However, there is no evidence regarding the advantages of this membership.  
 
Figure 5, Interlocking directorates of two umbrella organisations 
The orange circle L03 in Figure 5 represents the umbrella organisation. L03 has 
approximately 100 members: Moroccan mosques and its social/cultural organisations in the 
province of Noord-Holland. Figure 5 shows only the organisations that are included in this 
study: social/cultural organisations, mosques and umbrella organisation L04. There is no 
evidence that mosque organisation M04 is a member of umbrella organisation L04 but the 
organisations are related through board member 161B as he is 
member of the boards of both organisations.  
5.2 Persons 
In the analysis of interconnected persons, age, country of birth, 
gender, memberships of social networks, appearances on the  
 
From the internet, political party memberships and professional connection have been 
reviewed. These variables may not directly influence the extent to which persons are linked, 
but the information could provide information on the presence of interlocks or may suggest 
additional explanations.  
Figure 4, Interlocking directorates of two umbrella organisations 
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5.2.1 Country of origin and age 
Most of the board members are born in Morocco: 112 out of 135 board members. A minority 
(9) comes from other countries: Algeria, Tunisia, Suriname, Turkey, former Yugoslavia and 
Sudan. 14 board members are born in the Netherlands, 8 of them in Amsterdam. Information 
on the places of birth is considered relevant to understand the relationships between the board 
members. The information on countries of origin and the place of birth indicates that many of 
the board members come from the same regions, but even that board members of the same 
institutions sometimes share the same place of birth. The first can be explained by the specific 
areas where (labour) migrants used to come from, i.e. the north of Morocco, and in particular 
the province of Nador. Sharing the same place of birth may indicate that board members have 
known each other from early youth. Two boards have members who are born in the 
Netherlands. The other boards consist exclusively of members who were born abroad. From 
the nine members who were not born in the Netherlands or Morocco, seven are divided over 
the umbrella organisations and four are members of mosque organisations. The majority of 
the members of umbrella organisation CMO comes from Iraq, Turkey, Yugoslavia and 
Suriname. Three members of the CMO are born in the Netherlands but their parents originate 
from Turkey. The two members of umbrella organisation CGI are born in Turkey and 
Suriname.  
Table 1, Division by age and country of origin 
 
The overview of ages and countries of origin shows that the board members who are born in 
Morocco are represented in all age categories; the board members who are born in the 
Netherlands are in the range from 28 – 43 years old (see Table 1). The youngest board 
member (28 years old) is born in Morocco. All members older than 43 are born outside the 
Netherlands. Age may play a role in the opportunities to apply for a position in the board: it is 
not likely that young persons apply for a board position themselves (Loader et l, 2014, p. 145) 
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or that they are nominated and if this would be the case, they are not always welcome as older 
board members may perceive younger ones as more orthodox and more open to radicalist 
concept interpretations (Butter, 2011, p. 37).  
5.2.2 Memberships of social networks 
The data he internet, particularly those of the social media networks, provide insight in 
interlocks that did not show from the listings of the Trade Register, such as the density of a 
network. LinkedIn data provide information on professional careers, interests, and 
connections with others. Only 38 board members (25 percent) have a LinkedIn account or at 
least one that is not hidden from the public. Eight of these board members have more than 500 
connections with other LinkedIn account holders. All board members who are interlocked 
with political parties have more than 500 connections. The persons that have a LinkedIn 
account but do not have shares with other LinkedIn members (‘zero links’) could be treated as 
none on LinkedIn. However, the membership may provide information on profession and 
hobbies which can reveal additional interlocks with organisations that were not identified 
before. As an example, a person may be board member of a charity organisation, as his 
professional organisation is active in supporting that organisation. One board member with a 
LinkedIn membership did not show his curriculum vitae at all. Only 29 board members are 
Facebook users, i.e. 19 percent of the total number of board members. Different from 
LinkedIn, on Facebook it is more common practice to hide details on connections (Facebook 
friends) or to hide all the posts. In that case, the only information provided shows that persons 
actually have a Facebook account. In three cases, evidence of their board membership is 
visible on Facebook. Two persons mention their board membership on LinkedIn or Facebook. 
This may indicate that most board members keep their professional activities separated from 
their other duties or that they do not use the social media to strengthen their mosque network. 
Another explanation is that they do not prefer to share their activities in the religious field 
with others. As 25 of the 135 board members in this study mention their involvement in 
mosque organisation on other websites this explanation does not count for all of them.  
Both in LinkedIn and Facebook, an overview of interconnectivity only shows when the 
researcher is part of the network. Unfortunately, through LinkedIn, it is only possible to find 
out how many persons two board members share with each other if I would be linked with all 
board members subject to this study. This would have added significant value to the outcomes 
of the network analysis regarding those who are linked through LinkedIn. My invitations to 
38 board members on LinkedIn was accepted seven times. LinkedIn members may choose not 
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to accept the invitation of unknown persons, or are not active on LinkedIn besides being a 
member and posing information regarding his or her resume. Even in this case, an invitation 
was accepted, however this did not lead to new insights as this person has no interlocks.  
5.2.3 Appearances on the world wide web 
In the research, the number of appearances on the internet has been measured. The numbers 
do not include the social network accounts of board members. 53 of 135 board members are 
visible on the internet. For 22 persons, the hits include information on their board position. 26 
persons can be found as they are mentioned in social/cultural activities or the signing of 
petitions. 18 persons are mentioned in relation to their professional life. The information 
retrieved from the internet include informal or formal messages in the news and of the 
websites of the own organisations. The data however do not suggest that there are more 
interlocks than identified by the analysis of the data from the Trade Register.  
5.2.4 Professional connections 
From 59 board members their profession is known. It is not clear if and what the others do for 
a living. It may be assumed that a number is retired, as 38 of the board members are older 
than 65 years. The professions differ from garbage collector, kitchen aid to ICT professor. 
None of the known professions includes that of spiritual leader or imam. The number of self-
employed persons is 9, varying from shop-owner, taxi driver and lawyer. The information on 
the professional careers has not delivered information that could identify more interlocks.  
5.3 The interlocks 
The database of board members provides three columns of nodes. The first node is the code 
for the person, e.g. 198B. The second node presents the code of the particular board the 
person is member of, e.g. M02. The third node presents another membership of that person, if 
any. The columns with second and third nodes are filtered and uploaded in the network 
analysis tool Lynks (see also paragraph 1.3). This delivers an overview of the persons in the 
board networks and their interlocks. Seven board members, out of 135, have double functions 
in multiple organisations. 
The database section of the organisations contains two columns of nodes: the code of the 
organisation, e.g. L05, and the code of the organisation that is member of the first, e.g. L06. 
On an organisational level, 15 interlocks are identified. These contain the memberships of 
mosque and/or social/cultural organisations of umbrella organisations: 13 organisations 
(including umbrella organisation L04) are member of umbrella organisation L03; one mosque 
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organisation is member of umbrella organisation L04; and umbrella organisation L05 is 
member of umbrella organisation L06. 
5.3.1 Two umbrellas 
Umbrella organisations L03 and L04 do not have interlocks on a board member level but are 
connected through a membership see Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6, Umbrella organisations L03 and L04 with its board members 
5.3.2 One person, two chairs 
The board of umbrella organisation L04, i.e. the regional Union of Moroccan Mosques in 
Noord-Holland, consists of three members; Two of them have connections with other 
organisations (see Figure 7). Board member 198B is chair of both L04 and of mosque M01. 
Although the umbrella organisation and the mosque share the same address, there is no 
evidence that the mosque organisation is member of the umbrella organisation (see also 
Figure 5 on page 39). The interlocked directorate of board member 198B is the only 
connection between the two organisations; there is no additional information due to a limited 
appearance on the internet.  
 
 44 
5.3.3 One person, two secretariats 
Board members 198B is chair of umbrella organisation L04 and of mosque organisation M01. 
Board member 199B is secretary of both umbrella organisation L04 and of mosque 
organisation M02. Mosque organisation M01 is not a member of an umbrella organisation. 
Mosque organisation M02 is member of umbrella organisation L04.  
 
 
Figure 7, Interconnectivity of board members 198B and 199B 
5.3.4 Interlock social/cultural organisation and mosque 
Two board members (221B and 239B) are connected through the boards of mosque 
organisation M14, and social/cultural organisation S01. This might indicate that the two 
organisations form an informal whole but are divided for financial or administrative reasons. 
Additional information on address and activities did not provide evidence that the two 
organisations are linked, besides the interlocks of the two board members as mentioned 
above. 
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Figure 8, Connections between Mosque M14 and social/cultural organisation S01 
 
5.3.5 Absence of assumed interlocks 
Board member 257B (co-founder) of umbrella organisation L01 (CMO) has numerous 
appearances on the internet but he does not have (formal) interlocking directorates. Many 
news articles33 can be found that explain multiple connections, both with Moroccan 
organisations as well as with political or cultural organisations and the government. Based on 
his appearances in these articles and other publications it can be concluded that he must have 
a dense network and that he is influential within the Moroccan religious community in 
Amsterdam and beyond.  
 
                                                 
33  
http://www.geenstijl.nl/mt/archieven/2013/04/stichting_zendtijd_moslims.html; 
http://forums.marokko.nl/archive/index.php/t-2251049-moslimvoorman-driss-el-boujoufi-kent-geen-enkel-excuus-
voor-gedrag-marokkaans-tuig.html; http://www.parool.nl/buitenland/-ontheffing-voor-oudere-moslims-
zondag~a262175/;  http://www.openbeelden.nl/media/177370/Levensverhalen_Boujoufi.nl;  
http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2047581-marokkaanse-imams-op-tournee-in-nederland.html 
http://www.republiekallochtonie.nl/tag/driss+boujoufi;  
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1761485/2003/11/08/Ephimenco.dhtml; 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/5133/Media-technologie/article/detail/4207992/2015/12/15/Moslimomroep-voelt-zich-
buitenspel-gezet.dhtml ; http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/5091/Religie/article/detail/2909380/2011/09/15/Protest-jaagt-
besnijdenis-de-grens-over.dhtml  
http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/11/17/god-verdwijnt-uit-hilversum-1557214  
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6 Conclusions and reflection 
6.1 Conclusions 
In this study, Moroccan religious organisations in Amsterdam were considered as part of the 
civil society. This study aimed to explore to what extent board members of Moroccan 
religious organisations play a potential role in the participation of their members. The 
interlocks of the board members with other organisations are an important indicator for the 
contribution in participation. This is the case for only seven persons, not the most well-known 
persons in the arena according to the information collected from the internet. In the absence of 
relevant, visible interlocks, the conclusion is that the board members of mosques, 
social/cultural organisations and umbrella organisations do not play a significant role in the 
participation and integration process of the visitors of their mosques.  
6.1.1 Organisational structure of the Moroccan religious organisations in Amsterdam 
The great number of Moroccan (religious) organisations in Amsterdam would imply to find 
interconnectivity between specific mosques and social/cultural organisations as the latter 
carries out many non-religious activities of the mosque organisation, no evidence of structural 
interconnectivity has been found, besides the membership of mosque and social/cultural 
organisations regarding umbrella organisations. The Amsterdam umbrella organisations do 
not form an umbrella for all mosque or social/cultural organisations. The analysis shows a 
scattered overview with few links, opposed to what may be expected from umbrella 
organisations.  
This means that it is not likely that the organisations can contribute to the (political) 
participation of their members/visitors. The scarcity of interlocks is in line with the results of 
the study of Van Heelsum which concludes that Moroccan organisations have the highest 
number of isolated organisations, compared to other migrant groups in Amsterdam (van 
Heelsum, 2005, p. 23).  
6.1.2 Interlocks 
The interlocks or double-functions were the case for only seven persons. This can be 
interpreted as follows. There is likely not a strong network or the connections of the board 
members are not visible via the internet. It may still be that the individual board members 
have ties with others but the majority of them does not communicate this via the internet. A 
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minority of the board members have a dense network through social media. The scarcity of 
the interlocks can be an indicator that is not expected that board members play a significant 
role in the (political) participation of their members or visitors. As mentioned earlier, the 
absence of trust in civil society or the political system in a country can be compensated by 
interlocks. When a board member of a migrant organisation is also representative of a 
(political) non-ethnical organisation, this may generate the trust that is needed to diminish the 
ethnic boundaries (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 713). This does not seem the case for the 
majority of the board members investigated and the lack of interlocks may have a negative 
impact on trust. Without (political) trust, a door may be open for radicalisation as this starts 
with a decrease of trust in society (Slootman and Tillie, 2006, p. 51).  
6.1.3 Contribution to participation 
In the absence of relevant, visible interlocks, the conclusion is that the members do not play a 
significant role in the participation and integration process of the visitors of their mosques. As 
social capital is produced through networks of relationships (La Hue & Huckfeldt, 1998, p. 
571), the question is that in the absence of these networks, how migrants can build up social 
capital in order to participate in the country of destination or that they will be left by the 
wayside. This may be harmful for both the migrants and the Amsterdam civil society as the 
share of migrants is almost 9 percent of the total population of the city of Amsterdam, which 
in number can have a great positive or negative impact on the contribution to society. In dense 
networks, information is distributed through the (big) linkers (Heemskerk et al, 2002, p. 114). 
In the absence of these big linkers, the question is how the adherents of the board members 
investigated are reached. This does not contribute to a positive perception of the Moroccan 
Muslim community in the Netherlands either.  
6.2 Discussion 
Further research on interlocking directorates, not limited to board members of Moroccan 
religious organisations may provide insight in the contribution to participation regarding 
migrants.  
With the available data, the conclusion is drawn that there is hardly any interlock between the 
investigated organisations. However, if more and different data would be available, such as 
membership overviews of the particular mosque organisations, of political parties or other 
relevant organisations, this could shed new light on the research question and the conclusion 
of this study.  
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Social media, as Facebook and LinkedIn, have made it possible to have access to persons that 
are not within the direct day-to-day network of people. Through these media big linkers can 
be distracted from persons with few connections. However, the quality of the networks is not 
visible through these media, i.e. the degree of influence of the persons one is linked with.  
For this research, the limitations of both media have become visible. From an outsider view, 
only loose information from these media can be retrieved. LinkedIn gives the impression that 
you are only a few steps away from another member but it does not provide real insight in 
networks. This is not only when not all members of the specific network have been registered 
in the social media. Even if they were, still it would not be possible to overview it from an 
outsider’s point.  
For a reliable network analysis it is of course of great importance to have access to data of all 
members of a particular network but this study has learned that the researcher should be part 
of the particular network as well, in order to achieve the for the study necessary insights in the 
relationships within the network. In the absence of full access to members in networks, 
interviews with stakeholders would add to the information. This was not included in the 
research design as it was expected that this was hardly feasible.  
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